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Abstract
This paper, in a two-country duopoly model, compares destination-
and origin-based commodity taxes in a context of a unilateral tariff-
tax reform that fixes the world price and foreign welfare. We find that
the proposed reform reduces domestic welfare, and hence is strictly
Pareto-deteriorating under the destination principle while the oppo-
site holds under the origin principle. Moreover, it is shown that this
ranking is reversed if exports are taxed. In short, which is preferable
between destination and origin taxation depends on the tax principle
and which between imports and exports are taxed.
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1. Introduction
This paper compares destination-based consumption taxes and origin-based
production taxes in a context of tariff-tax reforms and imperfect competi-
tion.1 Rapid growth of world trade led by reductions in protective trade
measures is expected to guarantee welfare gains for the world as well as an
individual country.2 However, there is still hesitation to liberalize trade. One
main reason is that developing countries are concerned about future losses
in trade tax revenue that has a large share in total government revenue.3
Resistance to trade liberalization is also found in developed countries since it
inevitably leads to an uneven income distribution as the factor endowment
models, e.g., the specific-factors model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model, sug-
gest.4
In order to overcome these difficulties and facilitate trade liberalization,
the international institutions, e.g., the IMF and the World Bank, have been
proposing a policy reform consisting of trade tax reductions and accommo-
dating adjustments of domestic taxes. In seminal works, Hatzipanayotou et
al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) prove that a small open country
gains in welfare and government revenue from one unit tariff reduction and
one unit destination-based consumption tax increase. Keen and Ligthart
(2005), in contrast, demonstrate that the same no longer survives a duopoly
model.5 While these papers focus on a consumption tax as domestic taxa-
tion, Emran (2005) and Emran and Stiglitz (2005) consider the case in which
1We interchangeably use two terminologies a ‘destination-based tax’ (resp. ‘origin-
based tax’) and a ‘consumption tax’ (resp. ‘production tax’) unless any confusion arises.
2Baier and Bergstrand (2001, p. 22) find evidence that ‘tariff reductions still explain
three times as much trade growth as transport-cost declines.’ Love and Lattimore (2009,
p. 60) estimate welfare gains from tariff reductions.
3IMF (2005, p. 3) clearly reports this trend, concluding that ‘trade tax revenue typically
constitutes between one-quarter and one-third of total tax revenue in low- and middle-
income countries.’ Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) find evidence that revenue recovery fails
in low-income countries.
4See, for example, Chapters 4 and 5 in Krugman et al. (2010).
5Extending the Keen-Ligthart (2005) model, Naito and Abe (2008) and Fujiwara (2012)
find a welfare- and revenue-improving possibility.
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an origin-based production tax is available.
Apart from the above works, there is a large literature comparing des-
tination and origin tax principles in open economies.6 It is fair to say that
consumption taxes give rise to higher welfare under perfect competition and
a noncooperative tax setting (Mintz and Tulkens, 1986, Lockwood, 1993,
Kanbur and Keen, 1993, and Lockwood, 2001), but the results are very sen-
sitive to a subtle difference in assumptions once imperfect competition is
introduced. For instance, by assuming a non-cooperative tax setting in an
integrated duopoly market, Keen and Lahiri (1998) show that production
taxes are preferred, but Haufler et al. (2005) find that this result does not
survive market segmentation with a high transport cost.7 Turning attention
to tax harmonization, Keen and Lahiri (1993) and Keen et al. (2002) show
the superiority of consumption taxes.
Combining the above two strands of literature, this paper compares two
tax principles in a context of a unilateral tariff-tax reform. More specifically,
we focus on a policy reform composed of tariff reductions and adjustments
in either consumption or production taxes that fix the world price.8 The
reasons for considering this reform are as follows. First, this reform, which
is based on an observable variable (world price), can fix foreign welfare, and
so it neither is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy nor induces foreign retaliation.9
6Lockwood (2001) and McCracken and Stahler (2010) offer a comprehensive survey on
the comparison of two tax bases under perfect competition and imperfect competition,
respectively.
7Haufler and Pfluger (2004) also show the invalidity of the Keen-Lahiri (1998) result
in a monopolistically competitive model.
8One may claim that the reform that fixes the consumer price and/or government
revenue is more worthwhile to try. However, we do not deal with them not because they
are uninteresting but because they are technically difficult to analyze. In contrast, world-
price-fixing reforms have received attention in a context of multilateral trade reforms, e.g.,
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Mrazova (2011).
9The idea of fixing welfare of the rest of the world dates back to Vanek (1965), Ohyama
(1972), and Kemp and Wan (1976) in an argument of customs unions, and Lahiri and
Raimondos-Moller (1997) apply it to a context of a tariff-foreign-aid reform, but they
admittedly state that ‘the information requirement (of the foreign-welfare-fixing reform)
is quite demanding.’ (p. 487)
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Second, this requirement allows us to easily find whether the reform achieves
a strict Pareto improvement, i.e., it improves domestic welfare, and makes the
foreign country no-worse-off without any international lump-sum transfer.10
Under the above motivations, we develop a simple two-country duopoly
model to examine the welfare implications of the world-price-fixing tariff-
tax reform, with special attention paid to the comparison of tax principles.
We show that employing destination-based consumption taxes adjusted to
import tariff reductions worsens domestic welfare, and leads to a strict Pareto
deterioration, but adjusting origin-based production taxes raises domestic
welfare, and yields a strict Pareto improvement. Moreover, this superiority of
the origin tax is completely reversed if imports are taxed. These findings may
contribute to the literature on tax principle comparisons in open economies,
e.g., Keen and Lahiri (1993, 1998) in a context of a noncooperative tax setting
and Keen et al. (2002) in a context of tax harmonization.
This paper is planned as follows. Presenting a model, Section 2 examines
the case of destination-based consumption taxes. Section 3 turns to the case
of origin-based production taxes. Section 4 addresses two relevant issues
overlooked in the previous sections. Section 5 concludes. Appendix gives
mathematical derivations of the main results.
2. Destination-Based Consumption Tax
2.1. Preliminaries
This section presents a model. Suppose a two-country (Home and For-
eign), two-good (Goods 1 and 2) world in which Good 1 (non-numeraire)
is duopolistically supplied by a Home and a Foreign firms, and Good 2 (nu-
meraire) is competitively supplied by price-taking firms. Throughout this
10In the literature on tax harmonization, it is usually presupposed that international
income transfers are available. However, this assumption is quite restrictive as is well-
recognized in the literature. For example, Keen (1989, p. 2) states that ‘in practice there
is little prospect of appropriate inter-country transfers being made.’
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paper, we assume an integrated world market and linear demand and costs
of production.11 An asterisk (*) is attached to all the Foreign variables.
The preference of each country’s representative consumer is given by a
quasi-linear utility function u(C1)+C2 and u
∗(C∗1)+C
∗
2 , where Ci and C
∗
i , i =
1, 2 are the consumption of each good, and u(·) and u∗(·) are an increasing
and strictly-concave function. Letting p and p∗ denote the (consumer) price
of Good 1 measured by Good 2 for each country, utility maximization under
the budget constraint yields the demand functions of Good 1:
C1 = D(p) ≡ u′−1(p), C∗1 = D∗(p∗) ≡ u∗
′−1(p∗).
The Home government levies an import tariff t and a destination-based
consumption tax τ while Foreign observes laissez-faire.12 Then, an arbitra-
tion leads to relationships that p = pW + t+ τ and p∗ = pW , where pW is the
world price, and the world market-clearing condition is given by
D(p) +D∗(p− t− τ) = X + Y,
where X and Y are the output of the Home firm and the Foreign firm, respec-
tively. Solving this equation for p, we obtain the inverse demand function
p(X + Y, t+ τ) with the following properties:
pQ(X + Y, t+ τ) ≡ ∂p(X + Y, t+ τ)
∂(X + Y )
=
1
D′ +D∗′
< 0 (1)
pT (X + Y, t+ τ) ≡ ∂p(X + Y, t+ τ)
∂(t+ τ)
=
D∗
′
D′ +D∗′
> 0, (2)
where Q ≡ X + Y and T ≡ t+ τ .
From these assumptions, the profit of each firm is defined by
Home firm : p(X + Y, t+ τ)X − cX − τX
Foreign firm : p(X + Y, t+ τ)Y − c∗Y − tY − τY,
11We have confirmed that the results in this paper survive the case of segmented markets.
12Note that the export tax case corresponds to the negative value of t. For the time
being, we regard t as an import tariff, and the export tax case will be addressed later.
And, we discuss a situation where Foreign takes some trade policy in Section 4.2.
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where c ≥ 0 and c∗ ≥ 0 are the marginal cost. The first-order conditions for
profit maximization are
XpQ(X + Y, t+ τ) + p(X + Y, t+ τ)− c− τ = 0
Y pQ(X + Y, t+ τ) + p(X + Y, t+ τ)− c∗ − t− τ = 0.
Having in mind the linear demand such that pQQ = pQT = pTT = 0, totally
differentiating this system yields13[
2pQ pQ
pQ 2pQ
] [
dX
dY
]
=
[ −pT
−pT + 1
]
dt+
[ −pT + 1
−pT + 1
]
dτ , (3)
from which the comparative statics outcomes become:
∂X
∂t
=
−pT − 1
3pQ
,
∂Y
∂t
=
−pT + 2
3pQ
,
∂X
∂τ
=
∂Y
∂τ
=
−pT + 1
3pQ
. (4)
2.2. Reform
We now define the tariff-tax reform. As mentioned in Introduction, we focus
on the reform that consists of a reduction in tariffs and an adjustment in
consumption taxes in a way to keep the world price unchanged. Since the
world price is equal to pW = p(X+Y, t+ τ)− t− τ , this requirement is given
by
dpW =
[
pQ
∂(X + Y )
∂t
+ pT − 1
]
dt+
[
pQ
∂(X + Y )
∂τ
+ pT − 1
]
dτ = 0.
Substituting (4) into this equation, the two taxes must change according to
dτ = −pQ
∂(X+Y )
∂t
+ pT − 1
pQ
∂(X+Y )
∂τ
+ pT − 1
dt = −pT − 2
pT − 1dt. (5)
Eq. (5) has two notable properties. First, the consumption tax has to be
raised since (5) is rewritten as
dτ = −2D
′ +D∗
′
D′
dt,
13In what follows, we suppress the arguments of p(·) unless any confusion arises.
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and the coefficient of dt < 0 in the right-hand side is negative. The reason
is simple upon invoking that the effects of import tariffs are decomposed
into those of consumption taxes and production subsidies. Tariff reductions,
which are regarded as simultaneous reductions in consumption taxes and
production subsidies, increase domestic consumption and decrease domestic
production, thereby increasing Home’s imports. As a result of increased
imports of Home, the world price would rise if no policy were accommodated.
Accordingly, the Home government is required to raise the consumption tax
to suppress the increase in Home’s imports and to fix the world price.
Second and more importantly, the consumption tax must be raised more
than the magnitude of the tariff cut, i.e., |dτ | > |dt|. This is because the
consumption tax is the only policy instrument (other than the tariff) available
to the Home government. If the Home government were to use the production
tax/subsidy as well as the consumption tax, it could offset the effect of tariff
reduction by raising the production subsidy and consumption tax. However,
since the Home government can use only the consumption tax, which can
not play the dual role above, it ends up over-taxing domestic consumption.
Substituting (5) into the right-hand side of (3), it becomes[ −pT + (−pT + 1) pT−2−pT+1
−pT + 1 + (−pT + 1) pT−2−pT+1
]
dt =
[ −2
−1
]
dt.
Therefore, the rest of our task is to make comparative statics by replacing
the right-hand side of (3) with the above vector. The effect of the proposed
reform on outputs is thus obtained as follows.
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= − 1
pQ
,
∂Y
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= 0. (6)
Note here that both consumer surplus and the firm profit of Foreign are
unaltered with this suggested tariff-tax reform, and so does the Foreign wel-
fare. That is, the world-price-fixing tariff-tax reform is equivalent to the
foreign-welfare-fixing reform. This is a novel property of the world-price-
fixing reform since it is in practice impossible or too costly to fix foreign
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welfare, but our reform can achieve the same goal based on an observable
variable (world price). Furthermore, this property allows us to know whether
the reform achieves a strict Pareto improvement just by checking its welfare
effect on Home. In other words, the reform is strictly Pareto-improving if
and only if it improves the Home welfare. The next subsection is devoted to
considering whether this is the case.
2.3. Welfare Effects
Home’s welfare consists of consumer surplus CS, the firm profit Π and gov-
ernment revenue G, each of which is defined by
CS ≡ u(D(p(X + Y, t+ τ)))− p(X + Y, t+ τ)D(p(X + Y, t+ τ)) (7)
Π ≡ p(X + Y, t+ τ)X − cX − τX (8)
G = τD(p(X + Y, t+ τ)) + t[D(p(X + Y, t+ τ))−X], (9)
where X and Y depend on t and τ through the two first-order conditions.
Combining the foregoing arguments with these definitions of welfare compo-
nents, we establish:
PROPOSITION 1: A coordinated tariff reduction combined with an in-
crease in destination-based consumption tax fixing the world price reduces
the Home welfare, and achieves a strict Pareto deterioration.
(Table 1 and Figure 1 around here)
Resorting to the first low of Table 1, we interpret Proposition 1 intu-
itively. As mentioned in details, the Home government over-taxes domestic
consumption to offset the effect of a tariff reduction on the world price. As
a result, the demand curve of the world as well as Home shrinks, which, in
turn, leads the Home firm to decrease output while the Foreign firm’s out-
put remains unchanged. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1 where the
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duopolists’ reaction curves are depicted.14 The pre-reform reaction curves
are given by a bold locus, and E is the initial Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
When the Home government reduces an import tariff, the Home firm’s re-
action curve shrinks, and the Foreign firm’s reaction curve expands. The
reaction curves after tariff cuts are depicted as a dashed locus. If the Home
government raises a destination-based consumption tax so as to keep Y con-
stant, both firms’ reaction curves shrink, and the post-reform equilibrium
moves to E ′. Obviously, the Home firm’s output decreases from X to X ′.
In other words, the suggested reform has an anti-competitive effect, and so
the domestic (consumer) price rises, which has a negative impact on consumer
surplus. Furthermore, output contraction of the Home firm leads to its profit
loss. Although the effect on government revenue is ambiguous, the overall
effect on Home welfare necessarily becomes negative because the welfare loss
of the consumer and firm plays a dominant role regardless of the sign of the
effect on government revenue.15 In view of that this reform leaves Foreign
as well off as before, this reform is strictly Pareto deteriorating. The anti-
competitive effect of the reform is a key behind this result.
While the foregoing argument focuses on the case in which t is an import
tariff, it is readily modified to allow for the export tax case in which t is
negative, and dt > 0 represents an export tax reduction. Then, we have:
COROLLARY 1: A coordinated export tax reduction combined with an
decrease in destination-based consumption tax fixing the world price raises
the Home welfare, and achieves a strict Pareto improvement.
In this case, the world-price-fixing reform serves as a pro-competitive
14In our simple model, the Home firm’s reaction curve is ensured to be steeper than the
Foreign firm’s reaction curve, and hence the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is stable since the
slope of the former is −2 and that of the latter is −1/2.
15All we can say is that our reform increases revenue if the initial consumption tax is
sufficiently low. See Section 4.1.
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policy since it expands the world demand curve, and hence the Home firm
increases output. All we have to do is to reverse the above argument. Then,
the world gains from the pro-competitive gains.
3. Origin-Based Production Tax
3.1. Preliminaries
This section turns to using an origin-based production tax associated with
tariff reductions. We will show that the world-price-fixing tariff-tax reform
becomes a strictly Pareto-improving, and thereby contrasts to the case of
destination-based consumption taxes. We briefly sketch this result since all
the manipulations are essentially the same as those of the last section.
The arbitrage condition between the Home and Foreign markets gives
p = pW+t and p∗ = pW , which yields the following market-clearing condition:
D(p) +D∗(p− t) = X + Y,
and an inverse demand function p(X + Y, t) with the following properties:
pQ(X + Y, t) =
1
D′ +D∗′
< 0, pt(X + Y, t) =
D∗
′
D′ +D∗′
> 0. (10)
Since the Home government imposes a production tax s instead of a
consumption tax, the profit of each firm is defined by
Home firm : p(X + Y, t)X − cX − sX
Foreign firm : p(X + Y, t)Y − c∗Y − tY,
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
XpQ(X + Y, t) + p(X + Y, t)− c− s = 0
Y pQ(X + Y, t) + p(X + Y, t)− c∗ − t = 0,
from which the totally differentiated system is[
2pQ pQ
pQ 2pQ
] [
dX
dY
]
=
[ −pt
−pt + 1
]
dt+
[
1
0
]
ds. (11)
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The comparative statics outcomes are
∂X
∂t
=
−pt − 1
3pQ
,
∂Y
∂t
=
−pt + 2
3pQ
,
∂X
∂s
=
2
3pQ
,
∂Y
∂s
=
−1
3pQ
. (12)
3.2. Reform
Noting that the world price is pW = p(X + Y, t) − t, the requirement of
freezing the world price is given by
dpW =
[
pQ
∂(X + Y )
∂t
+ pt − 1
]
dt+ pQ
∂(X + Y )
∂s
ds = 0.
Substituting (12) into this equation, the two taxes must change as follows.
ds = −pQ
∂(X+Y )
∂t
+ pt − 1
pQ
∂(X+Y )
∂s
dt = (−pt + 2)ds. (13)
Eq. (13) allows us to know two key properties of the tariff-tax reform
that are parallel with the case of consumption taxes. To know them, it is
useful to rewrite (13) by using (10):
ds =
2D′ +D∗
′
D′ +D∗′
dt.
This form tells (i) that the production tax must be lowered as an import
tariff is reduced, i.e., ds < 0 and (ii) that more than one dollar of production
tax must be lowered when one dollar of tariff is reduced, i.e., |ds| > |dt|. The
reason for these properties is as follows. As already argued, a tariff reduction
has an effect equivalent to a consumption tax reduction and a production
subsidy reduction as a result of reduced tariffs. Therefore, the Home imports
increase since the domestic consumption expands and domestic production
contracts. Unless any policy is accommodated, the world price would rise.
In order to cancel this effect out, the Home government needs to encourage
domestic production by either lowering the production tax or subsidizing.
Furthermore, the production tax must be over-reduced since it is the only
policy instrument available to the Home government, which alone can not
affect domestic consumption.
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Substituting (13) into the right-hand side of (11), it becomes[ −pt + (−pt + 2)
−pt + 1
]
dt =
[
2(−pt + 1)
−pt + 1
]
dt.
Therefore, all we have to do is to compute the comparative statics outcomes
by using the above right-hand side. The output effects of this reform become
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
−pt + 1
pQ
,
∂Y
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= 0. (14)
Thus, it is easily inferred that Foreign’s welfare remains constant with this
policy reform since no change in the world price and Foreign output implies
that neither consumer surplus nor the firm profit changes.
3.3. Welfare Effects
The components of Home’s welfare are
CS ≡ u(D(p(X + Y, t)))− p(X + Y, t)D(p(X + Y, t)) (15)
Π ≡ p(X + Y, t)X − cX − sX (16)
G = sX + t[D(p(X + Y, t))−X], (17)
where X and Y depend on t and s through the two first-order conditions.
Making an argument parallel to Proposition 1, we arrive at:
PROPOSITION 2: A coordinated tariff reduction combined with a decrease
in origin-based production tax fixing the world price raises the Home welfare,
and achieves a strict Pareto improvement.
(Figure 2 around here)
The intuitions behind Proposition 2 are provided by referring to the sec-
ond low of Table 1. What deserves attention is that the effect of the reform
is completely the opposite between the cases of consumption and production
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taxes. As mentioned, a tariff reduction is accompanied by an over-reduction
in the production tax to neutralize the effect on the world price. This results
in an increase in the Home firm’s output since the effective marginal cost
(c+ s) falls.
Figure 2 graphically makes clear the above mechanism. In the figure,
the initial Cournot-Nash equilibrium is E at which the pre-reform reaction
curves (bold loci) intersect. Due to a tariff reduction, each firm’s reaction
curve shifts to the dashed locus. Since the present reform requires the Home
government to over-reduce the origin-based production tax, the Home firm’s
reaction curve shifts to the right. Then, the post-reform equilibrium becomes
E ′ at which the Home firm increases output. To summarize, the proposed
reform has a pro-competitive effect.
Recalling that the Foreign firm’s output is unchanged, consumer surplus
of Home increases due to the decline in the domestic price, and the Home
firm gains in profits. While it is unclear whether the government revenue
increases, Home gains from this reform since the pro-competitive and profit-
shifting effects play a dominant role in the overall effect.16 Invoking that
the Foreign welfare remains unchanged, this implies that the reform yields a
strict Pareto improvement.
While the preceding argument is confined to the import tariff case, it is
easily modified to the export tax case by assuming t < 0 and dt > 0. Then,
we have:
COROLLARY 2: A coordinated export tax reduction combined with an in-
crease in origin-based production tax fixing the world price reduces the Home
welfare, and achieves a strict Pareto deterioration.
Propositions 1 and 2, together with Corollaries 1 and 2, may provide a
16As shown in Section 4.1, this reform reduces government revenue if the production
tax is initially high enough.
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new insight on the comparison of commodity tax principles in open economies
that has been analyzed in a context of a non-cooperative tax setting (Keen
and Lahiri, 1998, Haufler and Pfluger, 2004, and Haufler et al., 2005) and tax
harmonization (Keen and Lahiri, 1993, and Keen et al., 2002). According to
our results, which tax principle should be adopted highly depends on both (i)
whether the commodity tax is destination- or origin-based, and (ii) whether
the trade tax is levied on imports or exports. In particular, the second
criterion has been overlooked in the previous studies all of which assume
away trade policies.
4. Discussions
This section addresses three important issues that are neglected in the previ-
ous sections. First, we consider the effect of the world-price-fixing tariff-tax
reform on government revenue. Second, we extend the foregoing arguments
to the situation where the Foreign government is not passive. And finally,
we comment the validity of our results in other market structures.
4.1. Revenue Effects
The preceding arguments have focused on the welfare effects of the policy
reform. But, as mentioned in Introduction, the effects on government rev-
enue are the most important concern particularly for developing countries
since they heavily depend on trade tax revenue. Thus, this subsection turns
attention to the revenue effects of the reform.
From Eqs. (20) and (24), it is ambiguous whether our policy reform
increases government revenue, depending on the initial consumption or pro-
duction tax. Eq. (20) allows us to know that the world-price-fixing tariff-tax
reform increases government revenue if the initial consumption tax is low
enough to satisfy
τ <
(
D
pT − 1 −X
)
pQ.
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In order to seek the intuition behind this finding, it is useful to decompose
the revenue effect as follows:17
dG = Ddτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ τdD︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+(D −X)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ td(D −X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
,
by totally differentiating (9). That is, if the initial value of τ is sufficiently
small, the positive effects dominate and revenue increases. At this stage,
one may guess that the reform improves revenue if the Home government
optimally chooses t and τ initially. This conjecture is correct because the
optimal consumption tax is computed as τ = XpQ < 0, which satisfies the
above inequality.18
Similar arguments are possible for the case of production taxes. From Eq.
(24), the sufficient condition for the proposed reform to enhance government
revenue becomes
s > −
(
D
pt − 1 +X
)
pQ.
In other words, the revenue effect is positive if the initial production is tax
is high enough. The reason for this is clarified by totally differentiating (17):
dG = Xds︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+ sdX︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+(D −X)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+ td(D −X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
,
and invoking that ds < 0, dX > 0, dt < 0 and d(D − X) = 0. Moreover,
the revenue effect is necessarily negative if optimal taxes are initially chosen.
This is because the optimal production tax is derived as s = XpQ < 0, which
violates the above sufficient condition for revenue increases.
4.2. Foreign Trade Policy
17Note that dτ > 0, dD < 0, dt < 0 and d(D −X) = 0.
18The optimal taxes are simply obtained by solving the two equations ∂W/∂t =
∂W/∂τ = 0.
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Sections 2 and 3 have presumed that Foreign observes laissez-faire. However,
this assumption is not essential for the main results. To show this, let us
assume that the Foreign government subsidizes its export, and the subsidy
rate is denoted by σ.19 Then, the Foreign domestic price is given by pW + σ,
where pW is the world price. And, Foreign welfare consists of consumer
surplus CS∗, the Foreign firm’s profit Π∗, and an export subsidy payment
G∗:
CS∗ ≡ u∗
(
D∗
(
pW + σ
))
−
(
pW + σ
)
D∗
(
pW + σ
)
Π∗ ≡
(
pW + σ − c∗
)
Y
G∗ ≡ −σ
[
Y −D∗
(
pW + σ
)]
.
At this stage, we continue to assume a unilateral policy reform, i.e., Foreign
does not change σ.20 Then, it follows that CS∗,Π∗ and G∗ are all unchanged
with the world-price-fixing reform since it leads to dpW = 0 and dY = 0.
In short, all the results in the last sections are valid even in the presence of
Foreign policies.
4.3. Market Structure
We finally comment the validity of our findings. Interestingly, we have con-
firmed that exactly the same conclusions as Propositions and Corollaries 1
and 2 can be established in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model
and in a duopoly with segmented markets. Looking at the literature on trade
policies, their effects are sensitive to a subtle difference in assumptions re-
garding the market structures (perfect competition, oligopoly or monopolistic
competition), and so on.21 In contrast, our results survive both perfect com-
petition and imperfect competition in the form of a Cournot oligopoly. In
19Negative σ represents an export tax.
20While multilateral reforms that involve a change in both countries’ policies are worth
considering, they are beyond the scope of this paper, and hence we do not consider.
21Markusen and Venables (1988), Helpman and Krugman (1989) and Brander (1995)
are, in a context of strategic trade policies, a representative work that makes clear how
the optimal trade policies are affected by the difference in assumptions.
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this sense, they may be useful for a practical policy-making concerning the
move from destination to origin tax bases proposed by the EU.
5. Concluding Remarks
By considering a policy reform consisting of a trade tax reduction and an
accommodating adjustment in a domestic commodity tax to fix the world
price (and hence the Foreign welfare), we have compared a destination-based
consumption tax and an origin-based production tax. It is proved that if
the reforming country imposes an import tax, its reduction and an increase
in the consumption (resp. a decrease in the production tax) that leave the
world price constant achieve a strict Pareto deterioration (resp. improve-
ment), namely, they lower (resp. raise) the Home welfare without affecting
the Foreign welfare. As a by-product of this conclusion, we have shown that
this result is reversed if the trade tax is an export tax. We hopefully be-
lieve that these findings would make sense over the debate which tax base
is preferable that has been made in a context of noncooperative tax setting
and tax harmonization.
Despite the above novelty, we admittedly leave much unexplored. First,
there are alternative strategies of tax reforms. The world-price-fixing re-
form we propose has an advantage stressed in Introduction, but one can
propose another reform strategy, e.g., a revenue-neutral reform that leaves
the government revenue unchanged. Second, we have focused on a unilateral
reform because we guess that it is much more costly and difficult to reach an
agreement under multilateral reforms. However, we do not at all claim that
considering multilateral reforms is meaningless. It is future research agenda
to pursue the robustness of our results by taking into account these aspects.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking into account that the two taxes must change
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according to (5), differentiating (7) with respect to t yields
∂CS
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −D
pQ ∂(X + Y )
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
(
1 +
∂τ
∂t
) = − D
pT − 1 , (18)
where use is made of (6). Analogously, the change in Π associated with the
reform is
∂Π
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= XpQ
∂Y
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+
[
pT
(
1 +
∂τ
∂t
)
− ∂τ
∂t
]
= 2X. (19)
Finally, the effect on government revenue is
∂G
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= D
∂τ
∂t
+ τD′
pQ ∂(X + Y )
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
(
1 +
∂τ
∂t
)+D −X
+t
D′
pQ ∂(X + Y )
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
(
1 +
∂τ
∂t
)− ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0

=
D
pT − 1 −X + (t+ τ)
D′
pT − 1 +
t
pQ
=
D
pT − 1 −X −
τ
pQ
, (20)
where the last line uses D′ = (−pT + 1)/pQ.
Aggregating (18), (19) and (20) and rearranging the terms, the welfare
effect on Home is derived as
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= X − τ
pQ
= −(p− c)
(
D′ +D∗
′)
> 0, (21)
where the first-order condition of the Home firm’s profit maximization is
utilized. Eq. (21) suggests that the proposed reform reduces Home welfare.
Proof of Proposition 2: Considering that s must change according to (13),
differentiating (15), (16) and (17) with respect to t yields
∂CS
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −D
pQ ∂(X + Y )
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pt
 = −D (22)
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∂Π
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= XpQ
∂Y
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+Xpt −X∂s
∂t
= 2(pt − 1)X (23)
∂G
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= X
∂s
∂t
+ s
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+D −X
+t
D′
pQ ∂(X + Y )
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pt
− ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0

= (−pt + 1)X +D + tD′ + (s− t)−pt + 1
pQ
= (−pt + 1)X +D + (−pt + 1)s
pQ
, (24)
where the last line uses D′ = (−pt + 1)/pQ
Summing (22), (23) and (24) up and rearranging the terms, the welfare
effect on Home becomes
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= (pt − 1)X + (−pt + 1)s
pQ
= (−XpQ + s)D′ = (p− c)D′ < 0.
(25)
Eq. (25) implies that Home gains from the proposed tariff-tax reform.
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Home firm’s reaction curve
Foreign firm’s reaction curve
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Figure 1: The Effect of the reform: destination principle
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Home firm’s reaction curve
Foreign firm’s reaction curve
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Figure 2: The Effect of the reform: origin principle
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X Y p CS pi G W W ∗ W +W ∗
consumption tax − 0 + − − ? − 0 −
production tax + 0 − + + ? + 0 +
Table 1: Effects of the reform
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